Why the Worst Forgers Were Former Government Printing Employees?

June 2, 2025
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By Marcus Thompson, Document Security Expert

After two decades analyzing thousands of fraudulent documents, I've learned something that might surprise you: the most dangerous creators of fake passport documents weren't basement criminals or tech-savvy hackers. They were people who used to work for the very institutions meant to protect us.

Let me tell you about Viktor.

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The Man Who Knew Too Much

I first encountered Viktor's work in 2018, though I didn't know it was his at the time. A routine check at Warsaw Airport flagged what appeared to be a legitimate Polish passport. The document passed initial security scans, fooled three different border guards, and even cleared our standard verification protocols.

Something felt... off.

The paper quality was too perfect. The holographic elements caught light in exactly the right way. Most forgers try too hard—they over-engineer the security features, making them more pristine than genuine documents. But this fake passport was different. It had the subtle imperfections that only come from someone who understood the manufacturing process intimately.

Turns out Viktor had worked at PWPW (Polish Security Printing Works) for twelve years before his dismissal in 2017. He knew which batch of security paper had minor color variations. He understood that the official lamination process sometimes created tiny air bubbles in specific corners. Most importantly, he had access to the exact inks, papers, and even some of the machinery used in legitimate production.

The Inside Knowledge Advantage

Here's what makes former government printing employees so dangerous in the wrong hands: they don't just know what security features look like—they know why they exist and how they fail.

According to Interpol's 2023 report on document fraud, approximately 60% of high-quality fake passports can be traced back to individuals with insider knowledge of official printing processes. The report specifically highlights how former employees of national printing offices represent a disproportionate threat.

During my investigation of Viktor's network, I discovered he'd been selling his expertise to criminal organizations across Eastern Europe. His fake passports weren't just convincing—they were using genuine security substrates he'd somehow acquired through his former connections.

But Viktor wasn't unique.

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The Spanish Connection

In 2019, I was called to Madrid to investigate what Spanish authorities initially thought was a breach in their passport database. Documents were appearing with correct serial numbers, proper biometric chips, even valid entries in government systems.

The truth was more unsettling.

Carlos Martinez had worked in Spain's national document production facility for eight years. When budget cuts led to his redundancy, he didn't just take his severance pay—he took detailed knowledge of production schedules, quality control weaknesses, and most crucially, the facility's waste management procedures.

Martinez realized that "defective" documents—those with minor printing errors or damaged chips—weren't always properly destroyed. With his access badge still active during his notice period, he systematically removed hundreds of these "waste" documents. To the casual observer, they looked like rejects. To someone with his expertise, they were blank canvases.

The Spanish Civil Guard's report documented how Martinez's operation produced over 800 fake passports before his arrest. Each document started with a genuinely manufactured passport blank, making detection nearly impossible through conventional means.

The Digital Age Twist

You might think modern security features—biometric chips, complex holograms, digital watermarks—would make insider knowledge less relevant. You'd be wrong.

Take the case of Jennifer Walsh, a former contractor at the U.S. Government Publishing Office. When she was let go in 2020, Walsh took with her something invaluable: detailed knowledge of the digital security protocols used in passport chip programming.

Working with international criminal networks, Walsh developed a process for cloning legitimate passport chips. Her fake passports didn't just look authentic—they were authentic, at least from a technical standpoint. The chips contained valid data structures, proper encryption, even legitimate government signatures.

The only reason we caught her network was through behavioral analysis, not technical detection. One of her clients used the same fake passport to travel to Dubai three times in a week—a pattern that triggered human investigation.

According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), insider threats represent one of the most significant challenges in document security. Their 2024 cybersecurity framework specifically addresses the risks posed by individuals with authorized access to sensitive systems and materials.

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The Psychology of Betrayal

What drives these former employees to become creators of fake passports? In my experience, it's rarely just about money.

During interrogations, most express feeling undervalued or betrayed by their former employers. Viktor told investigators he felt "thrown away like garbage" after his dismissal. Martinez claimed the Spanish government "owed him" for years of underpaid service. Walsh believed she was simply monetizing skills that her former employer had "stolen" from her.

This psychological profile makes them particularly dangerous. Unlike typical criminals who might make mistakes due to ignorance, these individuals operate with both technical competence and personal motivation for revenge.

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The Prevention Challenge

So how do we protect against insider threats in government printing facilities?

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has developed comprehensive guidelines for securing document production facilities, but implementation varies wildly between countries. Some facilities I've audited have world-class security protocols. Others... well, let's just say Viktor wouldn't have found them challenging.

Key measures include:

  • Comprehensive background checks with regular updates
  • Two-person integrity systems for all critical processes
  • Real-time inventory tracking of all security materials
  • Digital forensic monitoring of production equipment
  • Secure destruction protocols with independent verification

But perhaps most importantly, we need better psychological screening and support for employees with access to sensitive materials.

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The Arms Race Continues

Every time security protocols improve, the value of insider knowledge increases proportionally. The latest generation of fake passports I've encountered show a level of sophistication that would be impossible without detailed knowledge of official production processes.

Just last month, I examined a fraudulent German passport that included proper UV-reactive inks, correctly programmed biometric chips, and even valid entries in international database systems. The only way to detect its fraudulent nature was through isotopic analysis of the paper fibers—a technique not available to most border control facilities.

The document was traced back to a former employee of Bundesdruckerei, Germany's federal printing office, who had been terminated six months earlier.

Looking Forward

As artificial intelligence and machine learning become more prevalent in document verification, the insider threat paradox only deepens. The same employees trusted to implement these advanced security measures are also positioned to understand their vulnerabilities.

My advice to government agencies worldwide? Treat document security like nuclear security. The technology is only as secure as the people who have access to it.

Because in my experience, the most dangerous fake passport isn't created by a criminal mastermind in a secret laboratory. It's made by someone who used to have a government ID badge and intimate knowledge of exactly how the real thing is supposed to work.

Marcus Thompson is a certified document security expert with over 20 years of experience in fraud detection and prevention. He has consulted for government agencies across Europe and North America and currently serves as an advisor to the International Association for Document Security.

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